Reforming the Senate

“To a people as little blinded by prejudice or corrupted by flattery as those whom I address, I shall not scruple to add, that such an institution may be sometimes necessary as a defense to the people against their own temporary errors and delusions. As the cool and deliberate sense of the community ought, in all governments, and actually will, in all free governments, ultimately prevail over the views of its rulers; so there are particular moments in public affairs when the people, stimulated by some irregular passion, or some illicit advantage, or misled by the artful misrepresentations of interested men, may call for measures which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and condemn. In these critical moments, how salutary will be the interference of some temperate and respectable body of citizens, in order to check the misguided career, and to suspend the blow meditated by the people against themselves, until reason, justice, and truth can regain their authority over the public mind? What bitter anguish would not the people of Athens have often escaped if their government had contained so provident a safeguard against the tyranny of their own passions? Popular liberty might then have escaped the indelible reproach of decreeing to the same citizens the hemlock on one day and statues on the next.” “The Federalist Papers” number 63, Hamilton or Madison

It is more fruitful to turn to the Senate as a body subject to reform. Its election has already been changed once in our history as the 17^th amendment made it directly elected by the people of the individual states and not appointed according to the methods chosen by their state legislatures. There is no reason that it cannot be reformed again.

Prior to the passage of the 17^th amendment most of the States had already adopted measures making the direct popular election of Senators the means of their selection. The People do not like the idea that some elite or other is better qualified than they to choose their government. In theory, the reform made by the People at the time the 17^th was passed was to eliminate corruption. It was held that Senators from states like Rhode Island were the puppets of corrupt business interests the “Trusts” and that changing the means of election to direct popular election would correct this problem.

It should be remembered that the 17^th was passed in 1919 and the 18^th was passed in 1920. The 18^th read;

“Amendment XVIII

(1919)

Section 1. After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited.”

Prohibition has not come down in our history as one of the wisest decisions ever made. It is possible that popular sentiment also led to a wrong decision in the 17^th. Today Campaign Finance Reform is a hot topic political issue. Big business and special interests pay for the advertising necessary for election to national office. No Senator can be elected to office unless he has such backers. It sounds almost like the first two decades of the 20^th century over again. Paperwork laws and changes do little to reform a system. Human beings with personal interests will always work to find ways of corrupting it.

It is possible that the Senate could be reformed by passing an amendment forcing the States Houses to choose their Senators instead of by popular election. The system is highly recommended by J.S. Mill. It might last without major corruption for 100 years or so, since apparently it takes about that long for special interests to corrupt our method of selecting Senators. Possibly we should reform the method of choosing our Senators once a century as a matter of course to act as a check on the inevitable growth of political corruption. Even Confucian China became corrupted as officers selected by scholarship had to pay squeeze to those who financed their education.

Still there are other methods, one of which is also recommended by Mr. Mill, but which has a more democratic and less aristocratic flavor.

“According to this plan, the unit of representation, the quota of electors who would be entitled to have a member to themselves, would be ascertained by the ordinary process of taking averages, the number of voters being divided by the number of seats in the House: and every candidate who obtained that quota would be returned, from however great a number of local constituencies it might be gathered.”

And

“But it is important that not those alone who refuse to vote for any of the local candidates, but those also who vote for one of them and are defeated, should be enabled to find elsewhere the representation which they have not succeeded in obtaining in their own district. It is therefore provided that an elector may deliver a voting paper, containing other names in addition to the one which stands foremost in his preference. His vote would only be counted for one candidate; but if the object of his first choice failed to be returned, from not having obtained the quota, his second perhaps might be more fortunate. He may extend his list to a greater number, in the order of his preference, so that if the names which stand near the top of the list either cannot make up the quota, or are able to make it up without his vote, the vote may still be used for some one whom it may assist in returning. To obtain the full number of members required to complete the House, as well as to prevent very popular candidates from engrossing nearly all the suffrages, it is necessary, however many votes a candidate may obtain, that no more of them than the quota should be counted for his return: the remainder of those who voted for him would have their votes counted for the next person on their respective lists who needed them, and could by their aid complete the quota.”

This would mean that peoples votes would count.

“In the first place, it secures a representation, in proportion to numbers, of every division of the electoral body: not two great parties alone, with perhaps a few large sectional minorities in particular places, but every minority in the whole nation, consisting of a sufficiently large number to be, on principles of equal justice, entitled to a representative. Secondly, no elector would, as at present, be nominally represented by some one whom he had not chosen. Every member of the House would be the representative of a unanimous constituency.”

The last is the core of the matter. Creating a means of electing the Senate which allows third, fourth and fifth parties to get their members into it would break the stranglehold of the Two Party System on the appointment of our Judicial Branch. By making it possible for multiple parties to get their candidates into the Senate it would multiply the number of parties that Big Business and Special Interests would have to split their money among making it harder for them to buy elections. Certain of the parties would by no means vote in favor of certain of the sponsors involved making it possible for Citizens to be relatively sure that their representatives represented them and not some other interest. To quote Mr. Mill,

“The multitude have often a true instinct for distinguishing an able man, when he has the means of displaying his ability in a fair field before them. If such a man fails to obtain at least some portion of his just weight, it is through institutions or usages which keep him out of sight.”

Our Two Party System is just such an institution and usage.

This would change the Senate from representatives of the people of specific States to representatives of specific national groups crossing state lines. It would make the Senate into a National body instead of a Federal body. It would guarantee that any constituency large enough to get a person elected could get a person into the National Senate. It would also tend to create a multi-party Senate, such an example would help to stimulate multi-party development in other branches of the government.

This kind of reform addresses yet another problem facing the United States today. The map of the United States showing the division of counties between Bush and Gore in the last Presidential Election was enough to chill the blood of people familiar with history. The division was straight along the lines of big city vs. country and small towns. All the rural and quasi rural areas of the country went to Bush. The big cities went to Gore. That split was as close to 50-50 as you can get. In another 20 years the cities will have gotten a little bigger and the country vote will be only 40% or so. With the current system, where one big city like Albuquerque in New Mexico can provide more votes in a state race for Senate than all the farmers who live in the other 90% of the land, that 40% will be unable to elect a single representative to the Senate. 40% of the people of the United States will have no meaningful representation in the Congress of the United States. History shows that it takes only about 10% of the population actually dedicated to revolution to successfully overthrow an existing government.

A split along geographical lines is a dangerous precursor to revolution. Madison or Jefferson disliked the Mason-Dixon line for this reason. A split along economic lines is a dangerous precursor of Revolution. Cleisthenes reformed the tribes of Athens to nullify such a condition. When you combine these kind of precursors to revolution with a system that denies 40% of the population any representation in the Congress, it becomes enormously risky. The Two Party System guarantees that such division will be between two united opponents of almost equal strength. This adds to the chance of revolution. Add economic instability and a hot topic emotional issue like abortion and all the necessary ingredients for revolution are present.

Introducing additional factions into the National Government reduces these dangers. It guarantees representation to more factions. It makes several small splits in the electorate instead of 1 big split. In the Federalist Papers the multiplicity of factions between the various interests in the various states was considered a safeguard against this kind of problem and against corruption in general. The Federalist #10 by James Madison,

“Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other.”

“Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a greater variety of parties, against the event of any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal degree does the increased variety of parties comprised within the Union, increase this security. Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority? Here, again, the extent of the Union gives it the most palpable advantage.”

The Two Party System by forcing disparate groups to choose between two factions has destroyed this important element of our system. The Two Party System was seen by the Founders as one of the great faults of the British Constitution.

One of the important symptoms of this failure is the difficulty in getting Federal Judges appointed. Abortion has become an acid test for approval by the Democratic Party. Article VI of the Constitution states,

“The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the members of the several state legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of the United States and of the several states, shall be bound by oath or affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States.”

Pro-life positions are closely tied to religious beliefs and the Constitution specifically states that no person shall ever be required to pass a religious test to hold office in the United States. Denying pro-life Judges Federal appointments because of their personal moral beliefs is a direct and obvious violation of Constitutional Law. It is a religious test for office. About half the Senate is engaged openly in criminal violations of Constitutional law, a situation which should call for impeachment. Since the Senate judges cases of impeachment it is impossible to check this abuse. Article 1, Section 3,

“The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments. When sitting for that purpose, they shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two thirds of the members present.”

This is a measure of how deeply the Two Party System has corrupted and debased our system of government.

A system of electing the Senate which encourages a multi-party Senate will decrease the stranglehold of the Two Party System in our government, increase the real power of the voters by ensuring that their representatives represent their interests, and decrease the probability of revolution and general insurrection as our demographics change.

Changing the method of choosing the Senate along the lines discussed above is certainly a measure that needs to be investigated as a possible answer to many of the problems facing the Nation today.

This reform weakens the presence of the State governments in the Federal government and should be balanced with a means of increasing the State governments voice. The idea discussed in the article on the Electoral College of giving each Governor of each State a vote in the election of the President by the Electoral College would provide this balance. Such reforms done together might realistically address the problems facing the US today because of the tremendous demographic changes which have occurred since its founding.